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lW THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE UF UTAH 
I ['/\.tl, 
'''If [-Respomlent, 
Case No 19013 
;1J!' A. BUNDY, 
. 'c' fend an t-Appe 1 lan t. 
l'n' I. 
APPELLANT'S SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT IMMEDIATELY GRANTING 
DEFENDANT'S ORIGINAL MOTION FOR MISTRIAL. 
Immediately preceeding the calling of defendant's wife, 
c." i Elu11dy, tu the stand as a prosecution witness, defendant's 
,, , )Ct1ey reyuested and was granted an opportunity to discuss 
.t\ tne Cuurt whether it would be appropriate to permit her 
dlled as a witness against the defendant. (See trial 
111'Sr· r l pt, I). 2 3. The actual discussion occurring at the 
- .111.;' l1r)Wt3ver, is lost due to the failure of counsel, both for 
'tltc· und for the defendant, to request that the discussion 
1 p<iL L ,>f the record. The only available references 
1·1--',_,Jr,! to this discussion 3r1se at the time of defendant's 
;11111 1n(-it LlJn for mistrial which was later made. (See trial 
I I''' pp. 74-82.) At the time of this original motion 
1 1 l l1oweve1·, Lhere dppe._1.red to be substantial disagreement 
The fundamentri I L.SSLlf' ,,, 11,i1..J(_ \/1·i 
It is: Whether, in a ,_.rJ!l11 nc1 l p1 nst'Cilt 1(1n 'J.'1,J ·r t 11• Ir' 1 1:1 
d em o n s t r a t e d i n t h r E-' c, < > r t 1 <) f t I 1 l -1 (, t i , 1 r i , 1 1 e f "-' 11 \ i . j r 1 t 
should be permitted to testify aq,1i11st_ hu11. 
In common law juris(lictlnns, s111'-'e [)r1,)r tu tfit-• t 111,f 
Blackstone, the basic position of the law hi.ls been tl1:n: 
I n c r i mi n a 1 pro sec u t i o n s t h e w i f <:: 
may be indicted and punished separately 
But, in trial of any sort, they .-1re not 
a 11 owed to be e v l den c e £or , or a g a t n st , 
each other. Blackstone, Commentaries 
on the Laws of England 431 (1st Ed., 1765) 
It is recognized that, while many changes have ',H'c'UC;· 
since the time of Blackstone, the fundamental policies f:)r 
above rule have remained as a source of current law. It 
not the purpose here to challenge or analyze the possible pc,:1 
issues her':e 1nvol ved, but only to present for later cons tdicr J', 
the application of any such policy concerns in 
status of Utah law concerninq these issues. 
The new Utah Rules of Evidence (effective Septemlj>"l' 
1983) provide (Rule 501) that: 
Privilege is governed by the rommon J,1w, 
except as modified by statute or court rule. 
This rule is accompanied by the f(JlltJWl11•.J 
Rule 501 which stcct2s: 
The rt:cornmen<le(l d ,..:;u\12:-il 111\ 1.i i 
rev i s ion of the fl r i \1 i l c r-J t_' s t r i l > 1, , 1 l J 1 > I L f, 'l 
Uy the courts, and tfl<Jt ,-ill st,:1tut1>CY 
to the contrary be supr:.-•rcerl(-'11. 1'111·· S1111r-
2 
1 11 1 J<:::::,' li1cd tu ,-tdupt this recommendation, 
1,11 1 tf1-1t. 1-t_ wets ''disposed to delete 
Ii-> V, from the proposed 
1 1 ,in·] t )11is 1 e--iV0! the current statutory 
J!t t ·11l1.: 1:::1es Lil fu 1 l force ctnd effect.." The 
1'r)1J1-t d•:?(_'ldPd 1 nstearJ r-_o inv1 te the legislature 
t 1J address such st..,)tutory add1t1ons, deletions, 
,>r modifications. 
l" 1ltah then, t_he ri9hts belonging to a defendant in a 
,,,,,1 regdrding the admissibility of the testimony 
->)J,JtJSe nr1y1nate in a number of sources, as well as the 
The Utah Constitution, Article I, §12, 
J''1:J,_'s in peri-_1nent part, thut: 
I n c r i mi n a l prosecutions a wife s ha 11 
not be compelled to testify against her 
husband, nor a husband against his wife . 
f!lfc Utah Judic1ul Code, Witnesses, §78-24-8(1) additionally 
,,.,··1 f1c>s that a person cannot be examined as a witness in the 
c1rcurnstances: 
/\ husband cannot be exumined for or against 
his wife without her consent, nor a wife 
for or against her husband without his consent; 
nor c<1n either cluring the marriage or afterwards 
l>e, without the consent of the other, examined 
rlS to any communications made by one to 
the <Jther dur i11y the marriage . [exceptions 
11,Jt involved here] 
1''1 UL 111 R11!es uf C:v1cl2nce, which were in effect until 
,111'»1 l, 1983, (Rule 23), further provide that: 
.'ui usr.!d ir1 .1 cr1m1naL act1un has a privilege 
''' prevPnt his spouse from testifying in 
-.11t:'l1 1c·l 1on w11._h respect to any confiUential 
(' in1mu111L·11:.1011 lldd or made bet_ween them while 
3 
they were husba11J ancJ WL 1 
[exceptions n\)t 1 nv1)l ve<.l 
and, in Rule 28, that: 
( '\.' ·, l) t l l l _j \ ) I j I J 
l\"lt' J 
Subject to Rule 37 and dS uLllvr-w1se 
provided in paragraphs (2) 
and (3) [termination] of this rule, il spouse 
who transmittecJ to the other the LnformatLon 
which constitutes the communication, has 
a privilege during the marital relationship 
which he may claim whether or not he is 
a party to the action. The other spouse 
or the guardian of an incompetent spouse 
may claim privilege on behalf of the spouse 
having the privilege. 
and, finally, in Rule 37, that: 
A person who would otherwise have a privilege 
to refuse to disclose or to prevent another 
from disclosing a specific matter has no 
such privilege with respect to that matter 
if the Judge finds that he or any other 
person while the holder of the privilege 
has (a) contracted with anyone not to claim 
the privilege or, (b) without coercion ancJ 
wi •_h knowledge of his privilege, made J1sclosure 
of any part of the matter or consented tu 
such a disclosure made by anyone. 
The above collectively provide the basic sources of defec11'''' 
rights to make the claim that his spouse should nut \\av'",, 
permitted to testify against him 111 the insta11L ciCtcci1" 
further, that to have permitted her to do so LS yruun,ls 
a mistrial. 
The doctrine of marital privile<Je lr1 UtcJh has '' 
four different brornches with somewhat different i-u]C's 'I'""'' 
each branch, although all branches bas1,,1ll; sµt'' 




is founded in the common law 
,,,,J 'i7,:J-7'1-8, U.C.A., above-referenced. This absolute 
l 111 l'..:l tlv] doctrine which is most fundamentally involved 
. •,1 j( t J(J[). 
"Jnd branch, "non-compulsion," is supported by the 
1'1>11st 1tut1on, Article I, §12 and §77-6-1, U.C.A., and deals 
tr1 i!lStd.nces involving attempts to coerce or force a spouse 
-3gainst the other party to the marriage who is, additionally, 
to the specified action. In the matter before this 
1r1.1r;it1le cuurt, defendant 1 s spouse has not raised this issue 
-,d is apparently more than over-eager and willing to testify. 
'"-,'"" branch of the doctrine is therefore not applicable 
I' I ] t l o 
i1 lh i r·J br'3nch, 1' confidentia 1 communications, 11 founded 
oles 23 and 28, Utah Rules of Evidence, as well as §78-24-8, 
.c.11., th0uqh potentially involved, is not directly applicable 
" t:i-· 1:la 1m herein made is not that a confidential communication 
was disclosed, but the much broader claim that no testimony 
ii l ,111,,1 ld hci ve been permitted. 
l'h,_· [(Jurtlt and final branch, that of 11 waiver 11 pursuant 
37, Utah Rules of Evidence, and judicial decisions concerning 
3 'CLLicn.l in this action. There is potential concern 
-i11l,111t' s rights may have been waived through his attorney 
5 
and t.hat defendanL, thuUlJh 111....)t_ 11,·./1t I' 
been bound by said att.rJrney 1 s Ci•_'l_tuns. 
This court, in Stdte v. Browt1, 14 U.2d j24, 3HJ l'.2,i • 
at 932 (1963) stated that: 
Clearly, our Constitution and stdtutes yive 
both the husband and the wife d privilege 
that the wife shall not testify under these 
circumstances (in a criminal prosecution 
of the husband) without the consent of both 
the husband and the wife. 
Though one statute cited in Brown, suprrt, footnote 2, (i.,, 
§77-44-4, U.C.A.) has subsequently been repealed (L. 1980, ch. 
§1), the pertinent text of §78-24-8 ( 1) remains the 5.;me as 
was at the time of the decision in Brown, and specifically [XC0"1!• 
that before a spouse may testify in a criminal prosecut1. 
both the husband and the wife must consent. 
In Br.:iwn, supra., the defendant prevniled on appe.11 
was granted a second jury trial at which he was convicted, 
from which he appealed alleging that comments on the clct1n. 
marital privilege by the prosecuting attorney were in err•' 
In affirming the verdict below, the Court in Stcit.e v. Br,w· 
16 U.2d 57, 395 P.2d 727, at 729, (1964) stated: 
The defense could either claim the pr1vile'Jc> 
or w a iv e i t , w h i ch eve r i t L ho u CJ Ji t w CH!l rl 
be to its best a.(1vanta(3e. 1311t_ lt C(JU1(1 
not engag•c i11 halfway medsures by Wd1v1nJ 
the pr iv i l •c J e and ob ta i n l n 'J t. he be n e f 1 t 
of haviny her (the wife) testify ci11 1 l still 
claim some of the pr0Lecti1)!1 rcfusdl l,J 
t e s t i f y a f f ::> r d s i f t 11 '' p c i / 1 l '' ·J •.' 
is claimed, it should be scrupulously ;:i1-,Jtt'\_.t(.:d. 
6 
v. TruScj, 28 IL2d 317, 502 P.2d 113 (1972), this 
111n fc1ced w1t_h C<)rnrnent_s by a prosecuting attorney as 
"''1 1t fr'f•"nclant' s wot1lr1 say if asked, pointed out that 
I L the cir(_·umstances (in addition to other requirements) 
111tionary instruction could overcome possible prejudicial 
cS <Jf the prosecutor' S alleged statement violative Of the 
1'.lt'll privilege and, in footnote, pointed out that: 
any comment by the prosecutor which in a 
substantial way will impair or disparage 
cl clnim of privilege is improper and therefore 
ls error . Trusty, supra., at 114. 
,'<)nc l uded that: 
if it (the comment) be such that there is 
a possibility that it prejudiced the defendant, 
in the sense that there is any likelihood 
thnt there may have been a different result, 
then the error should be deemed prejudicial 
and another trial granted. id. 
The court went on to state that the fact that the trial 
,urt given what was deemed to be an appropriate "cautionary 
irJn" coupled with the determination that, under the 
'lr•c·1mstC1nce.s, the statement was not prejudicial justified the 
't 11rmdt1nn <)f the verdict of the trial jury. 
IJefendcint herein claims; First, that he is entitled to 
1-1 1 1 i l eqe not to have his wife testify against him; second, 
'1t1_o.J11-1 1 stn.n(11nrj his attorney's unrecorded statements to 
(wli.it,'vr,r tlH'Y may have been), he scrupulously protected 
l'l1 l1_'•V-:> t J tl1e l•cst {)f his ability under the circumstances 
7 
and did not knowingly waive> his t•ll< 1, 
a timely motion for m1stridl, t:>)rre,:Lly prc'Sl!rvt.:(1 ,1 :l 
right to assert the fourth, the t.-r1al (',Jlli-t JI)'_;' 
overruled the motion for mistrial; fifth, Lhe testimony ·if Ir" 1 e 11 ,J,, 
spouse did, in fact, preJudicel defendant_ to the <'Xt•c'llt 
there is a likelihood of a different result in the evew 
trial is granted; and finally, defendant is entitled t·) ci ,,, 
trial for the reason that the trial court erred in not immedtJL: 
granting defendant's original motion for mistrial. 
lAt the time of trial, defendant and his wife were 
in a bitter divorce action in which defendant was seeking 




state's witnesses at trial, other than Dr. Ltl],c 
(whose testimony was extremely br1ef and ind1r2,1 
of members of defendant's wife's family, namely: 
Lori Bundy's father: 
Lori Bundy's sister: 
Lori Bundy, herself: 
David Christiansen 
Sherry Christiansen 
the wife of the defen,Ja111_ 
and two police officers whose investigation 111furrno·1 
came generally from Lori Bundy's family. 
Defendant contends that, under the circumstances, any test1m0:. 
given in trial by Lori Bundy would be preJudicial. 
8 
1 1VJIJ 11 Ut' THE INFORMATION ARE FATALLY 
VL l3ECi\IJSE T!JEY FAIL TO ALLEGE A SPECIFIC 
uATE UN WlilCli THE ALLEGED OFFENSES OCCURRED AND 
;,[JIJlTlUL'lALl,Y ARE DEFECTIVE. 
111 instctnt actirJn, the information, as read to the 
1 '"· l uded, as to the alleged time of the offense: Count I: 
J1 'Jl>ollt June, 1981, and January, 1982," a period of approximately 
··J'" (0) months and; Count II: "on or about June, 1981, and 
11 st 1981," a period of approximately three (3) months. 
• 1 e "probable cause" provision of the information alleges a 
·,1t1stant1al number of possible opportunities providing a basis 
r tile prosecution of some one or more charges in the information. 
does not appear, either in the two counts themselves, 
,, 111 the probable cause provision, specific information alleging 
3pecific date or time on which any of the alleged offenses 
111: hctve occurred. 
fJCJring the trial. the complaining witness, in response 
question of whether she had sexual intercourse with the 
1 fl'r1<1ant during the "latter part of June, early part of July, 
'81" (trial trdnscript, p. 41) described events purportedly 
'·rrtr1q durtng that period of time, and when again asked by 
>,- i;rusecutor as to the time of the alleged events, the following 
All right. Now do you know when 
it was in terms of which month and 
wl11cll day·; 
9 
w i t n e s s : I a i n ' t s u r e , but c_ I 1 i 11 k L t 
th e e n d o f J u n e , J 1- h f-.! b e <1 l 11 1 \ 1 r 1 I 
of cTuly, I ain't sure. (trial trc.ins\Tlp1. 
p. 42) 
Later in the trial, the compl<'1 ining witness was ,1.:::;k'-:',1 \/,rh,_ 
she had sexual intercourse with the defenclanL pric;r to the ,1 ,,, 











What was the time just before that? 
May. I mean the month of May. 
You don't know the date? 
Uh uh. 
Can you remember the very first 
time? 
No. 
You don't remember the first time? 
Uh uh. 
The complaining witness was later requested to descr1be 
"last time" she alleges sexual intercourse occurred with <letenudfl' 
She responded that it was "December" and when asked, "Do 1 • 
know what day?", responded, "No, but it was between Cliristli 
vacation in our school." (trial transcript, p. 65) 
As a result of the above circumstances, as wel 1 
relating to the tr-1al of this action, def"ndar1L .J1.J "''L, 
fact, know which al lP'J•C>d acts of sodomy C111d/::>r rape· ,, .. , 
be charged. The does not reflect Lhat def,:>11I1 1 
1 I) 
:::JIJ(_'h kn0wl 12dqe a.t any time. The failure to charge 
1 'h spe,:1f11: cict.s violates his right to be informed 
irJes against him and denies him due process of law 
,,,, ""/'l 1t•!d by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
Constitution. For a similar ruling on a State 
see New Mexico v. Foster, 530 P.2d 949, at 951 (New Mex., 
l '074). 
to the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 4(b), 
R.Cr.P., §77-13-4(b) states: 
Such things as time, place, means, 
manner, value and ownership need 





:,: :i.) time prior to trial testimony of the complaining witness 
,.;es .JefPn<iant presented with information indicating to him anything 
'usely resembling the "time" of the commission of any alleged 
'.: f r.:ns':. 
The Utah Constitution, Article I, §13, provides in relevant 
th:-1t: 
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted 
by indictment, shall be prosecuted by information 
rift.er examination and commitment by a magistrate, 
unless the examination be waived by the 
dccused with the consent of the state . 
1'he Utah Supreme Court, in State v. Jensen, 96 P. 1085, 
"''lb (Utah, 1908) defined the purpose of this section. In 
1 11 1 ,1 convict. ion for fornication, the court stated: 
11 
The purpose of this pruv1sL()•1 of 1 11t' ,_::H1:,t 11 it l1n1 
is to secure to t11e JI !1 1 - i :._; 
brought to trial under .111 111tu1:-rnc1t i1_ir1, tit• 
right to be tl1•_' ii:1.t111-1:-_; 1JI tl1·· 
accusatl011 Llg,-i Lil St )l Llll cltl(i t_,> l)0 (:1J!lft- Jt1L1'li 
with and given an Ot)portun1ty tu L'C1)ss-exarnu11' 
the witnesses test1fy1n<J on behdl f .,f tile 
state. He is thus enable 1], if he so (les1res, 
to fully inform himself of the facts upon 
which the state relies to sustc11n thP ,_,harqe 
made against him and be prepared to meet 
them at the trial. [empln.sis acl<led] 
In State v. Nelson, 176 P.2d 860, (Utah, 1918), 
was convicted upon an information charging him with carnal knuwlei;-
alleged to have occurred July 13, 1917. A rnistridl 
and, before proceeding with a second trial. the prosecutor represc"· 
to the court that not one, but two, acts of intercourse,, 
occurred and that the state would elect to prosect1te the L' 
alleged to have been committed on July 15, 1917, two (2) 
subsequent to the date of the alleged act for which defen:la 
was prosecuted in the earlier trial. Defendant was L'unv1 1:r.: 
and appealed, alleging constitutional protection under the 
Article I, §13, involving the date of the allegeod offe"se 
Upon examination, and in response to the prosecutor's cuntc-<c __ 
that the date of the offense was not materidl. tl11s ':uurc, 
reversing the conviction, concluded that: 
While the date as alleged is imm<lter1al, 
the actual tTdnsaction char(Jed dS cunst l tllt L0 1 J 
the offense is always materLd.l, a.rid, Lf 
controverted, must be estd!Jl1sht-?d U'/ 
evidence tile accusec.1 can be cu11v11_'tP\I. 
supra., dt Bol. 
1 2 
1l>'J" 1 , tt is ,011 Jua.Ule Lhat, under the circumstances 
•r1 11uvv l)f-Jf 1 ,re tht_-' court, the allegations of time 
11rr-'-:':l1('i-' (Jl Lf1c offenses alleged are material to the 
'" 111 th·il they ,·onsLitute tile actual transaction charged. 
1 '1'' fur1damer1ta1 issue here presented is that the actual 
1'1'-i t 't 1 )n charged, cts well as the time concerned, is material 
11,rormat1or1. To permit the prosecution to convict defendant 
inf(Jrrnation which on its face contains an allegation so 
,.J dS to deny to the defendant any opportunity to consider 
" "1, L he vest lg es o f the very c r it i cal defense of a 1 i bi by so 
·' tL'lll r 1119 the information language to prevent defendant from 
·1«wi11g w1th any degree of accuracy, when the alleged offenses 
.vere< t<> have occurred or to determine whether double jeopardy 
ts1.,ns are violated is contrary to the Sixth and Fourteenth 
"''"d111e1Jts uf the United States Constitution due process provisions 
•S wel 1 as the laws of the State of Utah. 
TilP Utah Code of Criminal Procedure, §77-14-1, provides: 
The prosecuting attorney, on written 
demand of the defendant, shall within ten 
days, or such other time as the court may 
allow, specify in writing as particularly 
as is known to him the place, date and time 
of the commission of the offense charged. 
Cases in which the above 
11"' •Jr its predecessors have, in general, held that the 
·i "t 11nc' llf the offense" is material only where the defense 
is 1dvdn,·ed ir there is danger of double jeopardy. 
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State v. Waid, 67 P.2d 647 (Utdil, 1937); St'''° v. r:'"'l'', 
P.2d 764 {Utah, 1949) The Utah Code of Criinln<'ll Prui·(:, 1 
§77-14-2 (1), provides in relevant part, that: 
A defendant, whether or not written demand 
has been made, who intends to offer evidence 
of an a 1 ibi shal 1, not less than ten days 
before trial or at such other time as the 
court may allow, file and serve on the prosecuting 
attorney a notice, in writing, of his intention 
to claim alibi [compliance provisions 
follow] 
A similar code provision, §77-14-2 (4), further provides that: 
The court may, for good cause shown, waive 
the requirements of this section, 
indicating that the rule as to alibi defenses is not, on L· 
face, intended to be a hard and fast rule, demanding stru 
compliance. (See also, Utah Criminal Code, §76-1-106, Strh 
Construction Rule Not Applicable.) 
Given the circumstances above described, the date of»· 
alleged offense becomes an essential and material issue. De fenda. 
further contends that an allegation of a specific date is necessa• 
to give him notice of the crime charged. Defendant contenc. 
further that, without a proper allegation of a specific ,i,,-
of the alleged offense, defendant would not be able tu pln 
his conviction as a bar to further prosecution. 
14 
the fact that defendant did not raise the 
tssue in the trial court, this court is empowered 
ind decide the matter as indicated in this brief, pursuant 
de,·is1ons citing State v, Cobo, 60 P.2d 952 (Utah, 1936) 
1s palpable error. 
is entitled to a reversal for the reason that 
c. 1nfnrmation on file herein fails to allege a specific date 
.ii which the alleged offenses occurred and is void under both 
reder.i! and state provisions . 
.C\s this court has pointed out, Nelson, supra., at 861: 
When the pleader draws an information as 
contemplated by the Constitution, he must 
have in mind a particular transaction having 
the elements of time, place, and circumstance, 
which transaction in his judgment is unlawful. 
[emphasis added] 
f'JWT III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DISCHARGE 
DEFENDANT FOR INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE PRIOR TO 
PUTTING DEFENDANT TO HIS DEFENSE. 
At the commencement of the second day of trial in this 
.r L>Jn, the prosecution rested it case in chief. (trial transcript, 
159.) At this point no evidence had been introduced to demonstrate 
ri·.t the al leyed v1ct1m had not consented to participate in 
'·rs allec1eu to be the basis of this prosecution. Pursuant 
f>L, ,v 1 s lons »f the Utah Code of Criminal Procedure, §77-1 7-2 
»l by L. 1980, ch. 15, §2): 
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When it appedrs 
is not suffiC"ient 
to hi.3 defense, 
him discharged. 
lo tilt.-:' cuurl Lt1,tt 
ev 1Jt.•n(-::-:_' tu put d d0 [ l"J 1,Jd11 L 
i t s Ji d 1 1 [or th w 1 th '-' r J e r 
The defendant in this action, CL:iude A. Bundy, Ln c]' 
count information, was charged as follows: 
Count I. Rape, first degree felony at Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about June, 
1981, and January, 1982, in violation of 
Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 402, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, Claude A. Bundy, had sexual intercourse 
with Sherry Christiansen, a female under 
14 years of age, not his wife without her 
consent. [italics added] (trial transcript, 
p. 8) 
Count II. Forcible sodomy, a first degree 
felony in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
on or about June, 1981, and August, 1981, 
in violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 
403, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, 
in that defendant, Claude A. Bundy, engaged 
in a sexual act involving the genitals of 
tJ1e defendant and the anus of Sherry Christiansen, 
a female under 14 years of age, without 
the consent of said Sherry Christiansen, 
and engaged in sexual acts involving the 
genitals of Sherry Christiansen, a female 
under 14 years of age and the mouth of defendant 
without the consent of said Sherry Christiansen. 
[italics added] (trial transcript, pp. 8 
and 9) 
Section 76-5-402 ( l), 403 ( 1), and 403 ( 2), Utah Crim111°: 
Code, as amended .in 1979 (L. 1979, ch. 73, §§2 and J) 
that: 
402(1) A person commits rape when the 
actor has sexual intercourse with anoll1er 
person, not the actor 1 s sµouse, vvitl1ul.it 
the victim's consent. [italics added] 
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4UJ(l) A person commits sodomy when the 
1c·Lor en(:Jci(:Jes in any sexual act involving 
Lhe genitdls of one person and the mouth 
'Jr anus of dnother person, regardless of 
the sex of either participant. 
403(2) A person commits forcible sodomy 
when the actor commits sodomy upon another 
without the other's consent. [italics added] 
Ir1 the case of either rape or forcible sodomy, the elements 
,f the offense (in addition to intent requirements of §76-l-501(2)(b), 
·;tah 1.:r1rninal Code) are: first, the prohibited sexual act; 
second, involving a specified victim; and third, nonconsent 
en the pdrt of the alleged victim. 
Sections 76-5-402(2) and 403(3), Utah Criminal Code, as 
Jmended in 1979 (L. 1979, ch. 73, §§2 and 3) provide: 
402(2) Rape is a felony of the second 
degree unless the victim is under the age 
of 14, in which case the offense is punishable 
as a felony of the first degree. 
403(3) Sodomy is a Class B misdemeanor. 
Forcible sodomy 1s a felony in the second 
degree unless the victim is under the age 
of 14, in which case the offense is punishable 
as a felony of the first degree. 
T!Hese paragraphs c 1 early contain provisions for the enhancement 
i 1nrnishment in the event the victim meets the specified age 
1 i c nt. They do not, however, alter the elements of the 
1 t self. Notwithstanding the age of the alleged victim, 
lc•, 11 ents of the offense remain the same--only the severity 
of the punishment is altered. Fur 1J u 1 I t l ) t 1 l J , \ 1 'NI 1, 
alleged victim is under the :ige of 14 or nnt d•)es 11 , 
the necessity of proof of tile above stated elements uf Uw ,,1 1,,, 
Specifically, the statutes and information above ref 0 rc, 
require the element of lack of consent as a necessary elanent.-,-r"''Jill'd'" 
of the age of the victim. 
At trial in the inst.ant action, Mr. Carvel R. llarw"'' 
the prosecuting attorney (absent defense objections) declare 
in his opening statement that.: 
it's because she (the alleged victim) 
was under 14 that the acts were without 
consent. It will be our position in the 
case it doesn't matter whether she was a 
willing participant. The fact. that she 
was under 14 makes it without her consent. 
(trial transcript, p. 11) 
This statement is doubly significant in that first:; 
indicates the prosecutor's position that the alleged v1cti 
was, in fact, a "willing participant.," and second, that unJe 
his perception of the law, her willing participation was 
no significance. 
Defense counsel Dean P. Mitchell, ln his opening 
apparently concede'.1 that the prosecution statement WilS correc' 
and stated: 
Her (the alleged victim's) age, ln det.erm1nin0 
her credibility, really is not that much 
a fact-lr dnd yes, if you bel iev'" her, the: 
fact that she was under 14 at the time negates 
the prob 1 em of the St ate ha vi lhJ t. ',) prov l' 
consent. (trial transcript, P· 15) 
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'i'i'"rc>nt_ 1111sm1derstanding on behalf of both prosecution 
,11::::.t! 1,'ot1ns 1..:l is prr)bably grounded in a misreading of 
Utctl1 Criminal Code, as amended in 1973, (L. 1983, 
t''''' §76-5-406) which provides, in relevant part, that: 
An ;;ct of sexual intercourse, sodomy, or 
sexual abuse is without consent of the victim 
under any of the following circumstances: 
(7) The victim is under fourteen years 
of <l'-::Je. 
The quest.1un here presented is: Whether, in a prosecution 
r--1pe and forcible sodomy under §§75-5-402 and 403, Utah 
_rJ1111n,il Code, an informatiun which alleges as an element of 
'' ·11 the uffenses lack of consent on behalf of the alleged 
.1:ti111 dnd which, at the same time fails to allege or indicate 
',i_,,,,,1,1ent rel lance upon a general statute (§76-5-406, Utah 
--1 'Hndl Code) not referenced in the information and which by 
_-_s 'JW11 terms is in conflict with the elements of the offenses 
,s ,,Jle11ed in the information, is an information sufficient 
l '''l'l'urt first degree felony convictions on both of the alleged 
l-;::l1S>-'S. 
f'l1c' basis of the conflict presented is that, on the one 
1cl, the general statute (§406), covering specified prohibited 
-;, purpurtedly eliminates, in the event the alleged victim 
,,,,i,,r the <1ye of 14, lack of consent as an element of the 
1 t f On the other hand, the specific statutes (§§402 
1JJ spe1-1[iccilly require lack of consent of the alleged 
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victim as an element of tl1e rJfir'llS<'--Lt-'cJ.11-JI,·· 
the alleged victim--anLl ,1t1 .Jd 1 !1t Lundi ,,1111,irit 
pun i s hm e n t prov 1 s i o n i n t !1 e e v e c i t t 11 e a l I <:J e c i v i · t i rn t 0 
the age of 14. Remaining prov1siuns of the Utull C,Jt.Je, P<Jr· 
Sexual Offenses, (specifically §§4Ul, 4U4, <ttlcl 4U'J) n,,,1_ 
such distinctions as to punishment enhancement. 
No claim in the information was made that the sti1te, 
or indirectly, intended to rely upon the provisions of §76-5-"1.' 
Notwithstanding the fact that the court was on notice of d mi s11ncic· 
standing and/or confusir:>n on behalf of both prosecutto11" 
defense trial counsel, no cautionary instructions were g1 
that would overcome the prejudicial effects of the el11n111,1t1 
of the critical and material element of lack of consent as 
trial issue. State v. Trusty, 28 U.2d 317, 502 P.2d 113 (10/. 
No cautionary instructions were made to the JUry in0tco:. 
that, contrary to the charge stated in the informdtlrlll, '.' 
defendant was to be tried for an offense different frum t11·, 
charged and subJect to the provisions of §406, a prov1s1rJ11 '"'' 
could have been easily pleaded as part of SdLd 
It may be argued that the resµonsLb1lLty for such 111crLt 0 : 
do not reside with the trial court but Lt1c lJtah Cr1lflll1di 
§76-1-104 provides, in relevant µart, thc1t: 
The prov is UJflS ()f this coUe shall LiL' cu11sl 
in accordance w1tt1 these gener,il 
( l) 
2U 
I)•, 1 1 1 1 P .-1 • J c r u a t e L y the conduct and 
• 11 1 • 1 I 1 1 1 w I 1 1 ch st i_ tut e each offense 
"1 s.1 l•"Jlldr··J condllct that is without fault 
[1,1111 cr_n1rJ1-:>!(1flitl()!l dS __ ,rirn1nal. 
•"IJPr, lrl §7G-l-1U6, that: 
All pr0v1s1u11s of this code and offenses 
def 1ned by the laws of this state shall 
he construed according to the fair import 
of their terms to promote Justice and to 
effect the objects of the law and general 
purposes of section 76-1-104. 
In •Jrder to appropriately construe the above provisions 
rng the course of trial before a jury, it would be unreasonable 
to place upon the trial JUdge the responsibility to respond 
·' 'll<Hters such as those here presented. Sections 77-35-4(c) 
,i (d), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (Rule 4) provide that: 
(c) The court may strike any surplus or 
improper language from an indictment or 
information. 
(d) The court may permit an indictment 
or information to he amended at any time 
before verdict if no additional or different 
offense is charged and the substantial rights 
of tlle defendant are not prejudiced. After 
verdict, i'ln indictment or information may 
be amended so as to state the offense with 
such particularity as to bar a subsequent 
prosecuti•)n for the same offense upon the 
sdme set of facts. 
Tli1 '°'' pruv1sions authorize a trial judge to amend the indictment 
11J[,>rrn 1t1·--)!1 1n the event a "different offense is charged 
.1bslariti,1l r113hts ,,f the defendant are not preJudiced" 
11 t« "strike: ,iny surplus or improper language from 
Applici'ltion of either of these 
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remedies was available and within tilt-' puwer <lt Llil- t 1-1.,J 
Had the court been of the opinion theit the •Ji 
intent on the part of t_he victim w<Js not d requ1s1tf:! cl•_·r
1 
of the offense, the court was empowered to strike such 
from the information. Had the court been of the op11Hu11 
a charge different from the one charge was being tried, 
court was empowered to amend the information. The fact 
the court neither amended the information nor struck from lL, 
information the language regarding consent of the alleged vicl1,-
under circumstances in which such power and obligation were 
present is strong evidence that, in the mind of the court, 
element of lack of consent was an issue of the offense charged. 
Notwithstanding errors on behalf of other part1c1panc-
in the trial arena, the trial judge is additionally bounJ 
act, without motion on behalf of any party and "forthwith" 
protect a criminal defendant from going forward with his defens-
when insufficient evidence has been presented to so requ1,-c 
The trial court therefore erred in failing to discharge Defenda' 
Claude A. Bundy for insufficient evidence prior to putung n1 
to his defense. 
22 
CONCLUSION 
111°11 r1''1e1n c1nd in defendant-appellant's original 
·k fc>nd"'"- CI aude A. Bundy contends that he was wrongfully 
... J .in·l th.1L he> is entitled to a reversal of said conviction 
, .,.,1 t lie trial court erred in failing to grant his original 
TiJt_t,i11 for rnistr1al; the information on which he was tried was 
;.cre,·t 1vc fur the reasons that it fails to allege a specific 
;.ce arl!l is violative of due process as required by the United 
;·•it.es Constitution; and, finally, that the trial court erred 
·'failing to discharge defendant for insufficient evidence 
:.r1nr to putting to his defense. 
rhe Utah Supreme Court should remand this action to the 
District Court with instructions for a new trial. 
- / 
jt-/fl._ RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this the 
1 :t:Jber, 1983. 
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